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Abstract: Community-based conservation is advocated as an idea that long-term conservation suc-
cess requires engaging with, providing benefits for, and establishing institutions representing local
communities. However, community-based conservation’s efficacy and impact in sustainable re-
source management varies depending on national natural resource policies and implications for local
institutional arrangements. This paper analyses the significance of natural resource management
policies and institutional design on the management of common pool resources (CPRs), by comparing
Namibian conservancies and community forests. To meet this aim, we reviewed key national policies
pertinent to natural resource governance and conducted 28 semi-structured interviews between
2012 and 2013. Key informants included conservancy and community forest staff and committee
members, village headmen, NGO coordinators, regional foresters, wildlife officials (wardens), and
senior government officials in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism and the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Water and Forestry. We explored the following questions: how do national natural resource
management policies affect the operations of local common pool resource institutions? and how do
external factors affect local institutions and community participation in CPRs decision-making? Our
results show that a diversity of national policies significantly influenced local institutional arrange-
ments. Formation of conservancies and community forests by communities is not only directly linked
with state policies designed to increase wildlife numbers and promote forest growth or improve
condition, but also formulated primarily for benefits from and control over natural resources. The
often-assumed direct relationship between national policies and local institutional arrangements
does not always hold in practice, resulting in institutional mismatch. We aim to advance theoretical
and applied discourse on common pool resource governance in social-ecological systems, with
implications for sustainable land management policies in Namibia and other landscapes across
sub-Saharan Africa.
Keywords: common pool resource governance; design principles; forestry policy; institutions;
Namibia; wildlife policy
1. Introduction
The relationship between resource degradation and common property systems has
been the subject of intensive research for many years. The underlying debate is based on
the assumption that when resources are limited and accessible to multiple users, everyone
over-uses resources [1]. To avoid this ‘tragedy of the commons’, it was initially postulated
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that the commons should be privatised or, if kept as public property, exclusive rights to
entry and use should be allocated by public authorities [1]. However, this position has been
widely critiqued (e.g., [2–4]) because it overlooks the existence of local norms, rules, and
governance systems. There is now substantial evidence demonstrating that resource users
effectively conserve and sustain their natural resources over the long term through local
institutions [2,5–8]. In some countries, this understanding has led to the devolution of nat-
ural resource management, but with varying degrees of success [9]. Clearly, understanding
the conditions affecting success is important for informing developments in international
and national policy.
Common pool resource (CPR) theory has emerged as a strong analytical frame-
work for understanding the local characteristics of successful community-based conser-
vation [1,5,6,10,11]. Here, we refer to community-based conservation as an approach
where long-term conservation success requires engaging with and providing benefits for
local communities [12]. There is substantial literature that applies the CPR framework
to common resources in different ecosystems, including forests, rangelands, and marine
or freshwater systems [13]. Central to CPR theories are Ostrom’s eight design principles,
which outline common characteristics of successful long-enduring, self-governing CPR
institutions [2,14,15] (Table 1). Whilst there are many variations on this set of principles
which overlap considerably with conditions identified by other scholars [e.g., 10,11], they
remain a useful starting point to assess various local institutional arrangements that are
present in CPR systems.
Table 1. Design principles for long-enduring and self-governing CPR institutions [2,15].
Design Principle Explanation
1. Clearly defined boundaries 1A: User boundaries—individuals or households with rights to withdraw
resources from the CPR, and
1B: Resource boundaries—the boundaries of the CPR itself.
2. Congruence 2A: Congruence with local conditions—appropriation and provision rules are
congruent with local social and environmental conditions.
2B: Appropriation and provision—the distribution of benefits from appropriation
rules is roughly proportionate to the costs imposed by provision rules.
3. Collective choice arrangements Most individuals affected by operational rules can participate in modifying
those rules.
4. Monitoring 4A: Monitoring users—monitors who are accountable to the users monitor the
appropriation and provision levels of the users.
4B: Monitoring the resource-monitors who are accountable to the users monitor
the condition of the resource.
5. Graduated sanctions Violators of rules are sanctioned depending on the seriousness and context of the
offence by other users, by officials accountable to these users or from both.
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local means to resolve
conflict among users or between users and officials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by
external authorities.
8. Nested enterprises (for CPRs that are part
of larger systems)
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
In this paper, we use Ostrom’s principles to explore the relationship between nation-
ally prescribed institutional arrangements and devolved natural resource governance in
Namibia. The Namibian devolution process was implemented through the community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM) program, drawing on international ex-
perience, especially Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Programme for Indigenous Resource
Management (CAMPFIRE) [16]. CAMPFIRE demonstrated that in order to influence peo-
ple’s behavior, management authority and benefit rights need to be devolved to the lowest
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possible unit [16,17]. However, in this case, the actual level of devolution-associated success
was limited [18,19]. Thus, devolving authority to a higher local level is not sufficient to
ensure efficient CBNRM by itself. Institutional arrangements are also critical, including
how and by whom rules are made and sanctions are applied [3]. The presence of both
community conservancies (focusing on wildlife management and tourism) and community
forests (focusing on managing natural vegetation, forests, and woody vegetation, excluding
wildlife) in Namibia, with contrasting nationally prescribed institutional arrangements,
offers a natural experiment to explore the effects of these arrangements on local institutions
and participation in decision making.
Many approaches have been suggested to deal with the challenges of community
management of natural resources. These include CPR frameworks, CBNRM, integrated
natural resource management, co-management, and institutional design principles, among
others. CPRs are resource systems that are “ . . . sufficiently large as to make it costly (but
not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits” from their use [2]
(p. 30). Therefore, at the heart of CPR theory is an understanding that there is a tradeoff
between the costs and the benefits of excluding potential users, and the outcomes of this
tradeoff, both for the community as a whole and for individuals. Although not conceived
with this objective, Ostrom’s framework also overlaps with the social-ecological systems
concept which emphasizes the complex interactions and outcomes of different social,
biophysical, policy, and economic systems [18–21], and allows for analyses of systems
which are multi-layered at different internal and external levels, geographic scales, or
nested systems [21]. It also involves the active integration of local inhabitants’ voices,
knowledge, and expectations [22]. Although we do not apply the first and second tier
concepts of Ostrom’s social-ecological framework [23,24], we acknowledge these nested,
multiscale interactions in our analysis.
There is mounting evidence to show collaborative, community-based conservation
as important in helping national governments meet international policy targets, while
resulting in effective biodiversity outcomes [25]. At least 50% of the global land area is
under customary ownership and management; the livelihoods of 2–3 billion people are
directly dependent on the landscapes; and most of this land is rich in biodiversity [26].
The participation and rights of Indigenous peoples is listed as the first of 13 enabling
conditions in the CBD’s draft post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework [27]. Despite
considerable research on enabling conditions for effective governance of CPR, there is
limited empirical understanding in particular contexts, including Namibia, of under what
conditions institutional arrangements perform best [28].
This paper analyses the influence of national institutional prescriptions on local man-
agement of CPR institutions of communal conservancies and community forests. To meet
this aim, we explore the following questions: how do natural resource management policies
affect the operations of local CPR institutions and participation in decision making? and
how do external factors affect local institutions and community participation in CPRs
decision making? Results can contribute to an emerging research agenda on CPR theory [4]
and concepts of enabling conditions.
2. Namibian Context
Namibia is well known for its recent work in community conservation—including
community forests and communal conservancies [29]. Prior to 1960, all natural resources
belonged to the colonial or South African government, and it was not until 1968 that
freehold farmers’ rights over wildlife were recognized [30]. This property regime was
reinforced in 1975, when rights for white freehold farmers over wildlife were recognized
through the Nature Conservation Ordinance (No. 4 of 1975). This legislative reform
contributed to major increases in wildlife numbers on commercial farms for controlled
hunting, managed through a permitting system [31]. However, local people on communal
land had no legal rights to use natural resources or take action against any illegal hunting.
During the early 1980s, in response to declining wildlife numbers [32], conservationists
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started building trust with traditional leaders on communal lands, through the appointment
of renumerated game guards for patrolling and reporting. By the late 1980s, wildlife
populations substantially recovered [33]. This era marked the origin of CBNRM in Namibia.
However, it had no legal backing. After independence in 1990, to redress past inequalities
in land distribution and rights over wildlife, Namibia decentralized natural resource
management on communal land, with regional government offices still involved. The
creation of a mechanism for communal conservancies in 1996 marked a paradigm shift.
Communal conservancies enabled communities to manage the resources where they live,
and acknowledged the challenges of centralized government enforcement due to the large
distances from central offices and limited resources [34]. Following this, in 2001, a similar
mechanism for community forests was created.
By 2019, communal conservancies and community forests had been created on about
58.7% of all communal land, with an estimated 227,802 residents [35]. They covered 21.9%
of the national territory, compared to 17.6% in National Parks and state-owned concessions
and 6.1% in private conservancies. Thus, conservancies and community forests remain a
significant component of the overall national conservation estate. The numbers continue to
grow, with financial, technical, and political support from the national government, civil
society, and multilateral donor agencies including USAID, UNDP, GEF, and the World
Bank. However, there is an 84% overlap between conservancies and forests, which means
that the same geographical areas are subject to two different sets of policy prescriptions
and accountable to different government Ministries.
3. Materials and Methods
The presence of two contrasting nationally prescribed institutional mechanisms for
CBNRM offers a unique opportunity for a comparative analysis of their role in enabling
CBNRM on the ground.
The research consisted of two parts: a policy analysis and a set of key informant inter-
views. The policy analysis involved the identification of key laws and policy instruments
through desk searches followed by a comparative content analysis focusing on institutional
aspects and using CPR theory as a framework.
Subsequently, 28 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted between July
2012 and May 2013 using an interview guide to elicit information about the operations of
institutions involved in natural resource management. Interviews assessed the functioning
of local CPR institutions and determined the degree to which these institutions met condi-
tions regarded as important for successful CPR institutions: boundaries, decision making,
rules, monitoring, sanctions, and conflict resolution [2]. Further information about local
and external institutions was collected related to the following: origins and development
of the organization in terms of historical context and interests; institutional capacity in
terms of skills, personnel, and financial resources; and institutional linkages in terms of
levels of collective actions and information exchange.
The respondents were identified through snowball sampling. Individuals were tar-
geted by virtue of their institutional position or experience and were expected to have
in-depth knowledge of conservancies and community forests. At the national level, they
included senior staff in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Water and Forestry, and one relevant NGO Integrated Rural Development and Nature
Conservation (IRDNC). Regional and local respondents were selected from the Zambezi
region, where there was a cluster of overlapping conservancies and community forests.
They included government officials, NGO staff, regional foresters, chief control wardens,
and others including conservancy/community forest staff, and committee members and
community leaders. Interviews were conducted with three members of the same institution
wherever possible but, other than this, the sample size was not set in advance but was
reviewed during data collection using the principle of triangulation to determine whether
a point of saturation had been reached. Saturation is defined as the point at which addi-
tional data collection “produces little important new information or understanding that
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is relevant” [36] (p. 75). A full list of informants is presented in Table 2. A more in-depth
field study was undertaken in this region and is reported elsewhere [37].
Table 2. List of informants interviewed.
Informant No. Operational Level Sector Institution Position
1 National Government
Ministry of Environment and Tourism
(MET)
Deputy director, scientific
services
2 National Government Ministry of Environment and Tourism
Director, environmental
affairs
3 National Government Ministry of Environment and Tourism
National director, Regional
services and parks
management
4 National Government
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and
Forestry/Deutscher
Entwicklungsdienst (DED)
Community forestry in
Namibia programme
officer
5 National Government
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and
Forestry/Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Senior management
advisor
6 National Government Ministry of Environment and Tourism
Coordinator, Namibia
Protected Landscape
Conservation Areas
Initiative (NAMPLACE)
project
7 National NGO
Integrated Rural Development and
Nature Conservation (IRDNC)
Co-Director
8 Regional NGO
Integrated Rural Development and
Nature Conservation (IRDNC)
Regional Assistant director
9 Regional Government
Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier
Conservation Area (KAZA TFCA)
Regional Liaison officer
10 Regional Government Ministry of Land and Resettlement
Deputy director, regional
programme
implementation
11 Regional Government Ministry of Environment and Tourism
CBNRM warden, regional
services
12 Regional Government
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and
Forestry
Senior forestry technician
13 Regional Government
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and
Forestry
Community forestry
technician
14 Regional Government Ministry of Environment and Tourism
Landscape specialist,
Namibia Protected
Landscape Conservation
Areas Initiative
(NAMPLACE) project
15 Regional Government Zambezi regional council Chief regional officer
16 Local Communities Sobbe communal conservancy
Acting conservancy
manager
17 Local Communities Sobbe communal conservancy
Senior community resource
monitor
18 Local Communities Kwandu communal conservancy Conservancy chairperson
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Table 2. Cont.
Informant No. Operational Level Sector Institution Position
19 Local Communities Kwandu communal conservancy Manager
20 Local Communities Kwandu communal conservancy Field officer
21 Local Communities Kwandu traditional authority Headmen
22 Local Communities Mashi communal conservancy Chairperson
23 Local Communities Mashi communal conservancy Manager
24 Local Communities Sachona community forest Chairperson
25 Local Communities Masida community forest Chairperson
26 Local Communities Masida community forest Vice chairperson
27 Local Communities Kwandu community forest Honorary forester
28 Local Communities Lubuta community forest Chairperson
All interviews were conducted in person by the first author in either English or
in Silozi and lasted 1.5–2 h. Interviews were recorded in detailed handwritten notes,
audio recordings or both. All audio data were transcribed. The principles of thematic
analysis were used to organize the qualitative data by creating and applying codes to
the data [38,39]. The development of the coding protocol (categories) was informed by
the conceptual framework of CPR design principles [40] and codes (free nodes) based on
the research questions. Six broad ‘operational’ themes or codes were created, several of
which included two or more sub-codes. The six broad themes included the following:
(1) community characteristics; (2) rules in use; (3) rule enforcement; (4) support; (5) conflicts;
and (6) interactions. Coding was completed using NVIVO v.10, first according to the broad
predetermined themes and subsequently using ‘free’ nodes. Following coding, material
was extracted on each theme and synthesized into a summary.
4. Results
4.1. Desk Analysis: Key National Policies Influencing CPR Institutional Arrangements in Namibia
The regulations that affect CBNRM in Namibia are wide-ranging, dispersed across
various legal and policy frameworks and ministries, and have changed over time. This
makes implementation and coordination of CBNRM challenging. Here, we discuss five
key policies.
First, the policy on Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal
Areas was enacted by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism in 1995. In this policy, past
discriminatory provisions of the Nature Conservation Ordinance (1975) (the second key
policy) were removed for communal farmers to gain the same recognition of rights over
wildlife as freehold farmers. This paved the way for the formation of conservancies on
communal land.
Following this, legislative reform allowed conservancies to be registered through the
Nature Conservation Amendment Act 5 of 1996. The act recognized the right to the con-
sumptive and non-consumptive use (typically for tourism) and sustainable management
of wildlife in conservancies [41]. Many saw this as an important step for communities to
have greater control and benefit from resources; to provide for wildlife damages offsets; to
reduce uncontrolled harvesting; and to prevent harassment from illegal hunters [42]. Under
this act, clearly defined boundaries, membership, a committee, a constitution, and a plan
for the equitable distribution of benefits to members are all required to be a registered con-
servancy. Membership is voluntary rather than prescribed; and is based on how members
of the conservancy are defined by the adult (≥18 years) communal area representatives.
This enables communities to use existing institutions, including traditional institutions, as
the basis for their conservancy committee (see next section). An individual or community
can sell or lease the rights of management and exclusion or both, as outlined by the right of
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alienation. Property can be transferred from the Ministry of Environment and Tourism or
the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry to the communities in two ways. The first
is that property rights are awarded de jure, whereby the government explicitly grants such
rights to communities living in these areas by formal law. The second is recognition of de
facto rights, where land is communally owned and falls under customary law [43].
A third important policy is the Forest Act 12 of 2001. Like the conservancy legislation,
the act recognizes the rights of communities over forest resources, with the twin goals of
CBNRM in mind: conserving biodiversity and improving rural livelihoods. Communities
enter into a written forest management agreement with the government based on defining
boundaries, developing management and benefit-sharing plans, cost sharing arrangements,
and appointing a management authority. To date, however, the establishment of community
forests has been somewhat slow compared to conservancies, partly due to lack of funding.
The fourth important policy is the Communal Land Reform Act 5 of 2002, which is
implemented under the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (MLR). This act recognizes
customary law and makes provision for traditional authorities to administer, allocate,
and be involved in the registration of communal land rights. The act also determines the
conditions of grazing rights on communal land, including allocation to non-residents [44].
Customary land rights to areas under 20 hectares can be allocated to individuals for up to
99 years and transferred to descendants of the rights-holder.
Fifth, the Traditional Authority Act 25 of 2000 makes provision for traditional au-
thorities to apply customary law in the allocation of communal land, harvesting forest
resources and other matters related to CPR. The Traditional Authority Act is implemented
by the Ministry of Regional, Local Government and Housing and Rural Development
(MRLGHRD). Section 16 of the Traditional Authority Act requires traditional authorities
‘to support policies of government, regional councils and local authority councils and refrain from
any act which undermines the authority of those institutions’ (p. 13). Thus, most conservancies
and community forests are directly linked to a traditional authority [43,45].
Under this act, the traditional authority court (khuta), is the governing body in each
district (Figure 1). Each village has a headman (induna) and a senior headman (induna
silalo) who represents several villages. In most cases, the principal advisor (ngambela)
does not directly communicate with the chief (litunga), but instead information is conveyed
through the deputy advisor (natamoyo). Disputes are first considered at the village level
by the village indunas. If a solution is not found, the matter is escalated to the district
khuta where village and senior headman discuss the matter, overseen by the induna silalo
that presides over the district. If a solution is still not found, the matter is escalated by the
induna silalo to the higher traditional authority khuta to the ngambela. If the ngambela is
unable to settle the matter, it is referred to the litunga who will hear witness statements
privately and publicly with the concerned communities before a verdict. The last resort
would be to refer the matter to the magistrate court.
However, three areas prove challenging to the implementation of the Traditional
Authority Act: (i) it is open to interpretations when there are power struggles or legal cases
between traditional authorities and government [45]; (ii) customary laws (i.e., norms, rules
of procedure, traditions, and usage) that are not written down can be difficult for outsiders
to ascertain and subject to diverse interpretations; and (iii) enforcement is dependent on
the traditional authority’s legitimacy.
Table 3 summarizes the key features of the national prescribed institutional frame-
works for community conservancies and community forests that are relevant to CPR theory.
These relate to access and withdrawal, management decision-making, powers of exclusion,
and transfer of rights, including alienability.
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Figure 1. Simplified traditional rural governance structure in the Zambezi Region. Typically, khutas comprise of the chief
(litunga), principal advisor (ngambela), deputy advisor (natamoyo), senior headman (induna silalo), headmen (indunas, or
councilor) and secretaries. The ngambela is the administrator, while the natamoyo is the personal advisor to the litunga.
Table 3. Comparison of key features of nationally prescribed institutional arrangements for conservancies and commu-
nity forests.
Access and Withdrawal Management Powers Powers of Exclusion
Transfer of Rights,
Including Alienability
Communal conservancy
Geographical boundaries are
legally defined. Conservancy
members are legally registered
and their rights to use and
benefit from certain wildlife
resources are legally recognised.
Wildlife quotas are set by the
Ministry of Environment and
Tourism. The traditional
authority, not the conservancy,
may grant grazing rights to
non-residents.
Communal conservancy
management and executive
committees make management
decisions about wildlife.
Community game guards
monitor wildlife and report
violations to the Ministry of
Environment and Tourism.
Conservancies may apply for
permits for live capture and sale
of wildlife. They can also ask for
permission to reduce numbers of
certain wildlife species.
The management
committee can cancel an
individual’s
membership. The
community decides on
which villages may be
part of the communal
conservancy. However,
they have no powers to
exclude outsiders.
Rights to sell or lease the
resources are very limited. A
conservancy can enter into a
contract with an investor
granting them permission to
develop a tourism facility
such as a lodge. Customary
land rights may be transferred
to descendants of the
rights-holder.
Only the Ministry of
Environment and Tourism can
dissolve the communal
conservancy.
Community forest
Geographical boundaries are
legally defined.
Any person with traditional
rights to the area has rights to
harvest and benefit from forest
resources. Annual allowable cut
for tree species is determined by
the Directorate of Forestry.
Grazing rights can be granted by
the government in consultation
with the traditional authority.
Management powers over a
specified area are devolved to
the community level. The
community shares responsibility
with the Directorate of Forestry
regarding the control of forest
use.
Powers to exclude
outsiders from
encroaching the forest
are limited. The
traditional authority
may grant grazing rights
to non-residents.
Rights to sell or lease the
resources are very limited.
Customary land rights may be
transferred to descendants of
the right holder.
Only the Ministry of
Agriculture, Water and
Forestry can dissolve the
community forest.
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In the rest of this section, we explore and discuss the implications of the above
features for enabling implementation on the ground, informed by the results from the
semi-structured interviews and using Ostrom’s eight design principles as a framework
(Table 1).
4.2. Clearly Defined Boundaries
Design principle 1 is concerned with defining the boundaries both of users; the set of
individuals or households who have rights to withdraw the natural resources (principle
1A) and of the natural resources included or excluded under the CPR regime (principle 1B).
As outlined above, user boundaries are precisely defined under the legal frameworks for
conservancies, which should keep a register of all members. All conservancy constitutions
defined members by their residence status within the conservancy boundaries and in
most cases the register included information on residence status. However, the interviews
revealed contradictions between formal registration and customary systems of resource
governance. One elderly community member expressed this as follows:
I don’t have to register to become a member of this conservancy, Everyone knows I was
born here, even my parents were born here, this is my area, why should I register?
In contrast, members of community forests are defined by law as anyone with cus-
tomary land rights to an area, even if they do not currently reside in the area. This means
that user boundaries are not as clearly defined as for conservancies and there is no list
of members. On the other hand, there is more flexibility for decisions about which in-
dividuals or households are included—made according to local customary governance
systems. According to the chairperson of one conservancy committee that also administers
an overlapping community forest, the reasoning behind this approach is to ensure that
no-one with customary rights is excluded from benefiting directly from the use of forest
resources.
In relation to boundaries of the natural resources, the geographical boundaries of
both conservancies and community forests are legally defined and well understood by
local community members. In community forests, which are concerned only with the
management of stationary resources (plants), this is sufficient to fully define the boundaries
of the natural resources concerned. However, conservancies are concerned with wildlife,
some species of which move between conservancies, across landscapes and even between
countries, which greatly complicates efforts to set quotas and to monitor resources and
their use. According to a landscape specialist, this has been partially addressed through
joint game counts, patrols, and post-translocation monitoring of wildlife over a wider area.
4.3. Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions
Design principle 2A concerns congruence between rules for the appropriation, as
well as use and provision of resources with local social and environmental conditions. A
crucial aspect of environmental conditions is the state of the natural resources concerned.
In both conservancies and community forests, this was considered through the use of
ecological monitoring to set quota allowances. Monitoring in conservancies took the form
of annual game counts of different species, which was regarded as largely effective despite
the limitations related to wildlife mobility outlined in the previous section. Monitoring in
community forests took the form of forest inventories which, according to an official from
the Directorate of Forestry, were used in setting timber harvesting quotas. However, the
accuracy of forest inventories was raised as a potential limiting factor in the effectiveness
of the timber quota system.
There was little evidence of flexibility to adapt rules about appropriation and use to
local social and cultural conditions. Conservancies can request hunting quotas for their
own use for religious and cultural festivals from the Ministry of Environment and Tourism.
Subsistence hunting is not permitted unless individuals have paid for a permit, which most
members cannot afford runs counter to customary norms and practices.
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Design principle 2B is concerned with the distribution of costs and benefits from
resource management and use and the balance between them. In both conservancies
and community forests, members who were employed or who were in management
committees (incurring a cost in terms of time and effort) received monetary benefits in
return. Committee members stated that others received non-monetary benefits, such as
shared meat in conservancies and the rights to use forest resources including non-timber
forest products (NTFPs) in community forests. One option for conservancies was to offer
short-term positions so that more people would receive benefits over time. However,
according to one NGO official, this created challenges in terms of continuity and abuses
of power:
“Weak institutional memory is a challenge if you have a new committee that is enacted
every two to three years . . . Those [conservancy] positions are very vulnerable because
people see that [having a position in the conservancy] as the [main] benefit”.
4.4. Collective Choice Arrangements
Principle 3 states that most members who are affected by the rules within a CPR
regime should have a say in formulating the rules. This depends both on the extent to
which the rules are nationally prescribed or can be formulated locally, and second on who
has a say in decisions at the local level. In relation to the first of these, there are many
nationally prescribed rules for both conservancies and community forests over which the
resource users have no say. Members of conservancies raised this as problematic, saying
that the prescribed rules were too restrictive and that they were powerless to oppose
them. One example was the nationally prescribed ban on traditional subsistence hunting
without payment. Committee members expressed the view that at the least they should
be able to hunt birds (such as guinea fowl) and small animals (such as South African
springhare) for subsistence use, and also that they should be allowed to walk with dogs in
the forest for protection against wild animal attacks. During 2013 and 2014, the Directorate
of Forestry placed a national moratorium on the harvest and trade of timber in Namibia,
which affected income generation in community forests. The moratorium was triggered
by concerns about unsustainable use of forest resources, particularly in the north-eastern
regions of the country. The chairperson of one community forest expressed frustration over
the moratorium:
“They [the Directorate of Forestry] came to stop us from cutting timber because of
some other people outside the community forest that were cutting timber without permits,
why is that?”
NGOs have also played a crucial role in defining the rules for conservancies, and
while the intention may be to empower communities to formulate the rules, this may not
translate in practice. For example, one senior NGO official described the process as:
“Guiding conservancies to make sure they have good governance” but was quick to
admit that “ . . . we cannot pretend that we are not influencing them [conservancies]”.
In terms of local participation in rule-making, some conservancies promoted the
direct participation of all members (e.g., in attending annual general meetings, voting
on conservancy matters, speaking at any meeting) whereas others allowed only a small
number of representatives to participate. In community forests, the scope for member
participation was restricted both by the lack of regular meetings of the whole community
and by a lack of information about the occasional meetings that did take place. According
to the chairperson of one community forest, in many instances the management committee
took decisions in consultation with just the traditional authority.
4.5. Monitoring
According to principle 4, monitoring should be carried out regularly both of user
behavior (4A) and of the condition of the natural resources (4B), and monitors should be
accountable to the user group. In conservancies, monitoring took the form of regular patrols
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by community game guards who were employed by and answerable to the management
committees, whereas in community forests the committee members had to carry out
monitoring themselves. Conservancy monitoring tended to be carried out on a regular
basis, while community forest monitoring activities tended to be less regular due to the lack
of paid personnel and incentives. As was said by the chairperson of a community forest:
‘People are not willing to work for free, that is why some committee members prefer not
to be active’.
Both local and external respondents pointed out the lack of funds in community
forests as a major setback to the success of forest management. Interviews with forestry
officials indicated that funding to community forests had come mainly from international
donors. Most conservancies, on the other hand, secured substantial operational funds
from trophy hunting and other wildlife related activities such as joint-venture tourism.
An analysis of financial reports from a sample of conservancies in the study area show
that conservancy income varied between years and conservancies. Conservancies that
had diverse sources of income (e.g., trophy hunting and tourism joint ventures) showed a
steady increase in income over three years while those that relied only on trophy hunting
showed no clear patterns. However, the results further indicate that most of the funds
generated by conservancies went towards operational costs, leaving very little to benefit
the wider community.
Monitoring of natural resources is included in the policy prescriptions for both conser-
vancies and community forests. In both cases, responsibility for monitoring rests with the
user group, with assistance from other stakeholders (e.g., NGOs, ministries). According to
MET officials, conservancies are required to conduct annual game counts in order to be allo-
cated hunting quotas. Monitoring activities are described in Section 4.5 above. Monitoring
in conservancies tended to be much more regular and robust than in community forests,
because of the existence of financial resources and monetary payments for community
monitors. One government official from the Directorate of Forestry also indicated that local
forest monitors were prone to bribes from timber dealers and that therefore the Department
of Forestry needed to be involved in monitoring forest resources whenever possible.
4.6. Graduated Sanctions
Principle 5 states that violators of the rules are sanctioned according to a graduated
system, depending on the seriousness and context of the offence. This principle also
states that sanctions are applied by users, officials accountable to these users, or both.
Interviewees at all levels indicated that the principle of graduated sanctions was strongly
adhered to in both conservancies and community forests. The procedures for handling
cases of rule-breaking and types of conflict resolution or sanction depended on the severity
of the case. For example, sanctions for illegal hunting in conservancies varied according to
species. However, sanctions in community forests were generally mild unless the offence
involves harvesting high-value timber. Sanctions were commonly perceived as harsher
for first offences in conservancies than in community forests. However, severity of offence
was defined differently by different actors. For instance, one ministry official considered
illegal hunting involving protected and high-value species as a severe offence, while some
conservancy committee members regarded all types of hunting including possession of
game meat without permission as severe offences.
The extent of adherence to the second part of this principle, which relates to who
has the authority to apply sanctions, is less clear-cut. One conservancy field officer stated
that cases of illegal hunting of any wildlife species are reported directly to the Ministry of
Environment and Tourism, who then decide whether to fine the rule violator through the
court system or directly. In community forests, the users had greater powers of discretion in
relation to sanctioning. Community forestry chairpersons indicated that local violators are
usually just warned in the first instance and the illegally harvested product is confiscated.
However, persistent and serious violations are reported to the Directorate of Forestry.
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Collaboration between local CPR institutions and state institutions is particularly
important in relation to enforcement and sanctioning where rules are broken by outsiders.
In relation to conservancies, it was reported that communities cannot deal with serious
cases of illegal hunting by outsiders themselves due to their limited mandate, decision
making power, and equipment. The role of the traditional authority has diminished over
time, as reported by one conservancy manager:
“They [the traditional authority] don’t deal with natural resource crimes anymore,
although in the past the conservancy would report to them”.
Legally, conservancies can apprehend but not arrest offenders and they must report
them to the relevant ministry (e.g., Ministry of Environment and Tourism, Directorate of
Forestry) or police. In contrast, illegal harvesting of forest resources was still usually dealt
by the community forest management committee and the traditional authority.
4.7. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
Principle 6 states that users and their officials should have rapid access to low-cost,
local means to resolve conflict, whether it is among users or between users and officials.
This principle is adhered to in community forests than conservancies because, in community
forests, local conflict resolution mechanisms are in place and are often considered more
responsive and effective than those involving external authorities. Wildlife-related conflicts,
which fall under the responsibility of conservancies, are mainly handled externally by
government institutions.
Although several key informants agreed that the traditional authority plays an impor-
tant role in the governance of CPR in both institutions, there were different views about the
role of the traditional authorities and their relationship to the nationally prescribed institu-
tional structures. On the one hand, some informants argued that although the traditional
authorities played a critical role in the initial formation of conservancies, they interfered
with the later operations of the conservancy. On the other hand, respondents perceive that
the power of traditional authorities has been weakened by the new conservancy structures,
as voiced by one traditional leader:
“The conservancy is dominating us. Even now we have papers from the khuta [tradi-
tional authority court] saying we must deal with issues of natural resource use. We are
supposed to charge people and get money out of it, but the conservancy has now taken
over and dominates the khuta”.
4.8. Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organise
Principle 7 states that the rights of users to devise their own institutions should not
be challenged by external authorities. In Namibia, all communal land belongs to the state
but communities that apply and register their areas as conservancies and community
forests have conditional recognition of rights to manage and benefit from CPRs in their
areas. However, they have limited flexibility to devise their own institutions because of
the detailed prescriptions in national policy. Therefore, the principle is only partially met.
One particular issue arising from this study is that some aspects of the prescriptions are
incompatible with customary institutions and norms. Moreover, communities still need to
seek permission from external government ministries to use natural resources.
4.9. Nested CPR Systems
Design principle 8 states that the different aspects of CPR systems should be organized
in multiple, nested layers. This is the crux of the current paper, which focuses on the
relationship between the national and local levels. This is an area where CPR theory
intersects closely with social-ecological systems theory, based on the principle that higher-
level institutional structures and prescriptions should support local communities in order
to increase resilience.
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In the case of community forests and communal conservancies, the principle of nested
systems is adhered to in the superficial sense that there is more than one layer of orga-
nization. There are substantial prescriptions for institutional structures and rules at the
national level, whereas some details can be defined locally. There are also some aspects that
are defined internationally and are reflected in national policy (e.g., in relation to trade in
endangered species through the Convention of International Trade in Endangered Species
of Fauna and Flora). However, as the preceding sections have demonstrated, the extent
to which national components support local governance or give flexibility to adjust to
local contexts is very limited. In some instances, national policy is in direct conflict with
customary governance systems and has disenfranchised customary authorities. The overall
long-term effect may thus be to weaken, rather than strengthen, community coherence and
governance. Although legislation allows communities to manage resources, they must
do so within the specific prescriptions laid down at the national level and are still sub-
stantially dependent on government decision-makers to develop, implement, and enforce
national policies.
The existence of the two contrasting institutional frameworks at the national level
creates further complexity and confusion, especially where they are applied over the same
area of land. This was commented upon not only by community members but also by
government officials. One ministry official described the problem as follows:
‘I don’t think it is proper to give people an area to manage animals within it, but they
don’t have the right to use and manage the trees and plants around them. Would one take
the conservancy to court if the elephant kept on destroying the forest? Should a forester
say to the conservancy your elephants are destroying my forest? This is why all resources
should be inclusive and belong to one target group in a specific area’.
Interviews with government officials revealed that the ministries responsible for
implementing conservancy and community forest policies tended to make decisions inde-
pendently. This separation was further apparent at the local level through the formation
of separate committees for the two types of resources—often weakening pre-existing
traditional systems of natural resource governance. Some regional government officials
indicated that integrated decision-making system at the local level is difficult to achieve
because of the lack of cross-sectoral cooperation at higher levels and an NGO official
expressed the same sentiment:
“On the ground, yes, there is some sort of collaboration. But at national level, there is no
collaboration between the stakeholders within CBNRM. We need to sit together and chat
a future together, and do integrated planning, implementation and monitoring”.
The desk review of policies and other government documents revealed clearly that
the barriers to integrated natural resource decision making stemmed from segregated
national governmental structures and legal frameworks governing different types of nat-
ural resources, and particularly inadequate coordination between the separate agencies
responsible for management of wildlife and forests.
A simplified summary of the extent to which Ostrom’s design principles are met in
national prescriptions for conservancies and community forests is presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Strength of alignment between CPR design principles and institutional arrangements for conservancies and
community forests.
Design Principle Conservancies Community Forests
1a. Clearly defined user boundaries
Strong. A full list of registered users is
required in order to register a
conservancy.
Medium. Criteria for defining users are
set nationally but their application is left
to the local level.
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Table 4. Cont.
Design Principle Conservancies Community Forests
1b. Clearly defined resource boundaries
Medium. Geographical boundaries are
defined but wildlife are highly mobile.
Strong. Geographical boundaries are
defined and the boundaries fully define
the resources to be managed (plants).
2a. Congruence with local conditions
Social: Weak. Little evidence of flexibility
to adapt to local social conditions.
Environmental: Medium. quotas are
based on annual game counts, but game
move over large areas, limited
effectiveness of this approach
Social: strong. Few restrictions on most
subsistence forest resource use. Some
involvement of traditional authorities.
Environmental: medium. Timber
harvesting quotas are based on forest
inventories, but concerns were raised
about their accuracy.
2b. Proportionality of costs and benefits
Strong. Those who take on specific
activities such as monitoring are paid.
Weak. Very little financial benefits to
those who are involved in specific
activities.
3. Collective-choice arrangements
Medium. Many aspects are nationally
prescribed, but community members do
have a say in locally prescribed aspects.
Low. Many aspects are nationally
prescribed and for those that are locally
prescribed there is little opportunity for
most members to have a say.
4a. Monitoring of users
Medium. Regular patrols by paid
community game guards answerable to
management committee.
Low. Monitoring irregular due to lack of
incentives.
4b. Monitoring of the resource Strong. Regular game counts.
Weak. Forest inventories of variable
quality.
5. Graduated sanctions
Medium. Sanctions varied according to
the type of offence and whether it was a
first offence, but the powers of
conservancy to apply sanctions were
limited and the powers of traditional
authorities had diminished.
Medium. Sanctions varied according to
the type of offence and whether it was a
first offence but tended to be mild.
Community forest management
committees and traditional authorities
had greater powers to apply sanctions.
6. Low-cost local conflict resolution
mechanisms
Weak. Conflicts related to wildlife were
handled mainly by government
institutions.
Strong. Local conflict resolution
mechanisms in place.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to
organise
Medium. Both policy mechanisms (conservancies and community forests) enable
communities to gain recognition of rights to resource use in defined areas of land but
they must organize themselves according to rigid nationally prescribed institutional
requirements.
8. Nested enterprises
Medium. Both policy mechanisms (conservancies and community forests) involve
more than one layer of institutional structures but there are inconsistencies between
the different layers and further contradictions where conservancies and community
forests overlap.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
The above analysis provides some preliminary insights into the effects of nationally
prescribed institutional arrangements for conservancies and community forests and the
broader implications in terms of enabling conditions for community-based conservation.
First, it demonstrates the critical importance of adequate coordination across sectors,
scales, types of resources, and between different legal and administrative systems. This is
particularly needed considering the large dispersal area of wildlife which move across con-
servancy boundaries (similar to fisheries, see [46]) and require a nested approach involving
both local and external management. In Namibia, sectoral policies and legislation have
created competing and overlapping national, regional, and local community institutions
for management of different kinds of natural resources (wildlife, under communal conser-
vancies, and timber and NTFPs under community forests). The need for more integrative
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whole-of-government approaches across sectors is recognized as an enabling condition for
effective conservation in the draft post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework [27].
Second, it highlights the risk that overly rigid national prescriptions may be disen-
franchising traditional authorities and weakening the resilience of local social-ecological
systems. This is an issue that has been widely documented in other parts of the world
(for example see [47]). Ostrom’s design principles refer to nested systems that operate at
different levels and imply a balance between the creation of a framework at the higher
levels to enable local actions and the need to leave flexibility for the details to be designed
locally according to the local social and environmental context.
Third, financial independence is critical to any institution that hopes to produce
results and perform administrative functions. Conservancies were able to generate income
through tourism, whereas no community forests were reported to have secured long-
term funds for their operations, and this was recognized as a major constraint. The
identification of sustainable sources of conservation finance is a key issue in the post-
2020 Global Biodiversity Framework, including finance for community contributions to
conservation [48]. We recommend the introduction of measures to ensure that communities
receive direct benefits in return for their efforts, which could motivate them to sustain
active participation in forest management and hold positions for a longer period to avoid
rent-seeking behavior and loss of institutional memory and effectiveness [49]. Where
conservancies and community forests overlap, opportunities for joint monitoring exist.
Forest inventories need to be regularly updated to ensure that allocated harvesting quotas
are still within sustainable limits. The allocation of wildlife hunting quotas to a cluster of
conservancies in the same vicinity could improve congruence with resource conditions.
Fourth, as early as 1998 [34], Jones called for a change in policy to embed secure land
tenure in natural resource management systems to ensure that communities hold secure
rights over all natural resources on their land. Although progress has been made (e.g.,
through the Flexible Land Tenure Act 2012 and CBNRM policy which promotes integrated
land and natural resource planning and decision making), more than two decades later,
the strengthened tenure rights have not materialized for most communities in spite of
widespread recognition in academic and global conservation policy fora of the fundamental
requirement for secure tenure rights as a precondition for the long-term effectiveness of
community-based natural resource management [27,50]. There is a pressing need to revisit
the current legislation to strengthened tenure rights and ensure conducive environment for
the development of community conservation in Namibia.
The analysis in this paper of conservancies and community forests from Namibia
demonstrates the value of Ostrom’s design principles in highlighting how national policies
may enable or disable community conservation in particular contexts. However, it also
indicates the complexity and plurality of the relationships between national policies and
local institutional arrangements. An overarching conclusion is that over-prescription at the
national level can be counterproductive, weakening customary governance systems and
local social-ecological resilience. The extensive body of research on CPRs has demonstrated
that it is not just the nature of the rules and other institutional arrangements that is impor-
tant, but also that the resource users are fully involved in their design and implementation,
including defining resource boundaries, enhancing the monitoring, enforcement, conflict
resolution and prosecution capacity, and meeting regularly with a wide range of actors
to continually evaluate operation rules and norms, overcome ambiguities in handling
violations, and enhance compliance [2,51].
Our research aligns with a recent focus on how environmental policies might be
designed and transformed to improve the outcomes of community conservation. When
the study was conducted, officials working in the different ministries responsible for
implementing conservancy and community forest policies and legislation were making
decisions independently. In 2020, the Department of Forestry was incorporated into the
Ministry of Environment and Tourism; however, it is too early to evaluate the effect of
such a change to the governance of wildlife and forest resources. This analysis provides
Sustainability 2021, 13, 10663 16 of 18
a basis on which a detailed analysis of the actual performance of CPR institutions can be
conducted; to determine under which conditions certain CPR systems would perform best.
This study could also be used as a basis for follow up to see if conditions have changed
and therefore provides a baseline which could be used to assess further changes in policy
frameworks. We hope to have contributed to the global debate on theories about CPRs and
environmental policy analysis.
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